
Political Science 6400

International Relations Theory

Fall 2024

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Classroom: 315 Perelman Political Science and Economics

Class sessions: Thursday, 8:30-11:30

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Please note that this syllabus is preliminary—it will change prior to the semester, although the general outline and the types of material included will remain the same. It is posted here so that potential students can get an idea of what sort of material would be covered. In particular, potentially interested students should be aware that the course is intended for doctoral (Ph.D.) students who intend to take the comprehensive exam in international relations. It thus focuses on the history of the IR discipline and on its core theories and concepts; by contrast, there is little or no discussion of current events and contemporary foreign policy debates. In my experience, many students outside the doctoral program who express interest in the course ultimately find it to be both less rewarding and more intensive than they expected—as a result, I ask students not in the doctoral program to reach out to me to discuss whether the course makes sense to them prior to the semester.

This course surveys the field of international relations, focusing on the foundational concepts, methods, and theories that underlie contemporary research. The primary goal is to provide graduate students who intend to take comprehensive exams in the IR field with the grounding necessary to do so successfully. Others will be permitted to take the course only if they can demonstrate the prior knowledge and ability to participate successfully and if they can convince me that they will benefit from doing so.

In general, classes will begin with lecture that is designed to place the materials for the week in an appropriate context and to highlight key questions and debates, and then we will proceed to discussion. Students are expected to read assigned materials in advance of every session after the first and to participate actively in discussion (25% of final grade). Readings are listed in three categories: required, recommended, and supplemental. You are expected to have read and be prepared to discuss all required readings when we meet. Recommended readings will also be discussed during the class session, and are thus worth reading if you have time; these readings are also generally available through the course Canvas site. Supplemental readings further extend the discussion—they are worth reading prior to comps or if you are writing on a particular topic in

your midterm or final, but will typically be less central to the day's discussion. You will be well prepared for the discussion if you are able to briefly summarize a reading's main argument, connect it to the broader literature, comment on what you see as its strengths and weaknesses, and raise questions or points of interest for discussion.

In addition, there are three written assignments over the course of the semester. Two are take-home midterm and final exams, which are modeled on the comprehensive exam. The midterm (20% of final grade) will be distributed by October 13 and must be submitted through Canvas by 10pm on October 25. The final (25% of final grade) will be distributed before Thanksgiving and must be submitted through Canvas by 10pm on December 7.

The third written assignment (30% of final grade) is a 10-15 page analytic review of three or four books published in the past four years that have implications for international relations theory. I have posted a list of potentially relevant books on the course Canvas site, though you are welcome to suggest alternatives. Please notify me no later than September 16 of the books on which you wish to write. While some summary of the authors' arguments will be necessary, the discussion should focus on critique and on implications for the field more generally (including connections to topics that we have discussed during the semester). The final paper should be submitted to me through Canvas no later than 10pm on December 20. To give you an idea of what the goal of the review essay is, we will read some good recent review essays (by Hyde and Saunders and by Kang) in the second half of the semester.

There are four required books for the course, which can be acquired online:

- Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*
- Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*
- Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*
- Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*

All other materials are available through JSTOR (J) or the course Canvas site (C).

Class Schedule

The History, Geography, and Purpose of International Relations (August 29)

ALL READINGS RECOMMENDED

(J) John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2:2 (January 1950), 157-180.

(J) Robert A. Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest," *American Political Science Review* 55:4 (December 1961), 763-772.

(J) Ole Wæver, "The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations," *International Organization* 52:4 (Autumn 1998), 687-727.

(C) Daniel Maliniak, Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers and Michael J. Tierney, "Is International Relations a Global Discipline? Hegemony, Insularity, and Diversity in the Field," *Security Studies* 27:3 (2018), 448-484.

(C) Dan Reiter, "Should We Leave Behind the Subfield of International Relations?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 18 (2018), 481-499.

(C) Helen Milner, Ryan Powers, and Erik Voeten, "The Myth of the Eclectic IR Scholar?" *International Studies Perspectives* 24:3 (2023), 308-335.

(C) Ido Oren, *Our Enemies and US: America's Rivalries and the Making of Political Science*, Introduction.

(C) Bob Vitalis, *Black World Order, White Power Politics*, Preface and Chapter 1.

(C) Errol A. Henderson, "Hidden in Plain Sight: Racism in International Relations Theory," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 26:1 (2013), 71-92.

Theories, Evidence, and (the Limits to) Inference (September 5)

*Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, ch. 1.

*Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, ch. 1-4 (don't worry about understanding the mathematical formalizations, and feel free to skim chapter 2 after page 49. Chapters 5 and 6 are also useful.)

(C) Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, *Progress in International Relations Theory*, forward by Waltz and ch. 2 (Lessons from Lakatos) by Elman and Elman.

RECOMMENDED

(J) Gabriel A. Almond and Stephen J. Genco, "Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics," *World Politics* 29:4 (July 1977), 489-522.

(J) Erik Gartzke, "War Is in the Error Term," *International Organization* 53:3 (1999), 567-587.

(C) Robert Jervis, *System Effects*, ch. 1-2.

(C) Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations*, ch. 1-2.

(J) James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38:2 (1994), 236-269.

(J) Edward Miguel, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti, "Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach," *Journal of Political Economy* 112:4 (2004), 725-753.

(C) Cyrus Samii, "Causal Empiricism in Quantitative Research," *Journal of Politics* 78:3 (2016), 941-955.

SUPPLEMENTAL READINGS

(J) James D. Fearon, “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science,” *World Politics* 43:2 (1991), 169-195.

(C) Seva Gunitsky, “Rival Visions of Parsimony,” *International Studies Quarterly* 63 (2019), 707-716.

Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*.

Imre Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,” in *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, 1965*, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave.

Henry Brady and David Collier, *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*, ch. 1-3, 11-12.

Jack Levy, “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25:1 (2008), 1-18.

Barbara Geddes, “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Research,” in James Stimson (ed.), *Political Analysis*, vol. 2, 1990, 131-150.

Joseph P. Simmons, Leif D. Nelson, and Uri Simonsohn, “False-Positive Psychology: Undisclosed Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allows Presenting Anything as Significant,” *Psychological Science* 22 (2011), 1359 - 1366.

B. A. Nosek et al., “Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Science,” *Science* 349:6251 (2015).

(C) Steve Smith, “Positivism and Beyond,” in Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zelwski, eds., *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, 11-44.

Thad Dunning, *Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences: A Design-Based Approach*.

(J) Jason Lyall, “Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53:3 (2009), 331-362.

(J) Jeremy Ferwerda and Nicholas L. Miller, “Political Devolution and Resistance to Foreign Rule: A Natural Experiment,” *American Political Science Review* 108:3 (2014), 642-660.

Matthew A. Kocher and Nuno P. Monteiro, “Lines of Demarcation: Causation, Design-Based Inference, and Historical Research,” *Perspectives on Politics* 14:4 (2016), 952-975. See also Ferwerda and Miller response online at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2628508.

Kenneth A. Schultz and Justin S. Mankin, “In Temperature Exogenous? The Impact of Civil Conflict on the Instrumental Climate Record in Sub-Saharan Africa,” *American Journal of Political Science* 63:4 (2019), 723-739.

Walter Scheidel, *Escape from Rome: The Failure of Empire and the Road to Prosperity*, ch. 4-6.

Power and Rational Choice (September 12)

(C) Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, book V, chapters 84-116.

(J) Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Relations,” *International Organization* 59 (2005), 39-75.

(C) Fiona Cunningham, “Strategic Substitution: China’s Search for Coercive Leverage in the Information Age,” *International Security* 47:1 (2022), 46-92.

- (C) Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, ch. 1.
- (C) David A. Lake and Robert Powell, "International Relations: A Strategic-Choice Approach," in David A. Lake and Robert Powell, eds., *Strategic Choice and International Relations*, 3-38.
- (C) Emily Hafner-Burton et al., "The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations," *International Organization* 71:S1 (2017), S1-S31.
- (C) Kathleen E. Powers and Dan Altman, "The Psychology of Coercion Failure: How Reactance Explains Resistance to Threats," *American Journal of Political Science* forthcoming.

RECOMMENDED

- (C) Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science*, June 1957, 201-215.
- (J) Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power," *American Political Science Review* 56:4 (1962), 947-952.
- (J) Jack S. Levy, "Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems," *Political Psychology* 13:2 (1992), 283-310.
- (C) Robert Powell, "Research Bets and Behavioral IR," *International Organization* 72:S1 (2017), S265-S277.
- (C) Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, 117-155, 181-191.
- (C) R. Harrison Wagner, *War and the State*, ch. 1.

SUPPLEMENTAL READINGS

- (C) David Baldwin, "Power and International Relations," in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, *Handbook of International Relations*, pp. 177-191.
- David Baldwin, *Paradoxes of Power*, ch. 2.
- J. David Singer, "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Military Capabilities of States, 1816-1985," *International Interactions* 14:2 (1988), 115-132.
- Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, remaining chapters.
- Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*.
- (J) Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," *World Politics* 49:3 (1997), 371-400.
- (J) Barry Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World," *World Politics* 43:3 (1991), 313-335.
- (J) Jonathan Mercer, "Emotional Beliefs," *International Organization* 64:1 (2010), 1-31.
- Khong, Yuen Foong. *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*.
- Rose McDermott, "The Psychological Ideas of Amos Tversky and Their Relevance for Political Science," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 13:1 (2001), 5-33.

Anarchy, Neorealism, and the Balance of Power (September 19)

- (C) Thomas Hobbes, *The Leviathan*, Part I, chapter 13.
- *Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, ch. 2, 5-8.
- (C) Nuno Monteiro, *Theory of Unipolar Politics*, Introduction and chapter 4.

- (J) Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30:2 (1978), 167-214.
- (C) Beth Simmons and Robert Shaffer, "Border Anxiety and International Discourse," *American Journal of Political Science* forthcoming.

RECOMMENDED

- (C) Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations*, ch. 2-3.
- (J) Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory," *International Security* 19:1 (1994), 108-148.
- (C) Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism," in Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War*, 23-56.
- (C) Robert Jervis, *System Effects*, ch. 3.

SUPPLEMENTAL READINGS

- Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, ch. 1, 2, 4, 6, 8.
- (C) Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, ch. 1 and 3.
- (C) E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, ch. 5-8.
- (C) Albert O. Hirshman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*, 3-52.
- (J) John A. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition", *American Political Science Review* 91:4 (1997), 899-912.
- (J) Milner, Helen, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique." *Review of International Studies* 17:1 (1991), 67-85.
- Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations*, ch. 4-5 (a critique of collective security as an alternative to the balance of power).
- Edward Vose Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power*.
- Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*.
- (J) Robert A. Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," *International Security* 30:1 (2005), 7-45.
- (J) Stephen G. Brooks and William Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," *International Security* 30:1 (2005), 72-108.
- (J) John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15:1 (1990), 5-56.
- (C) John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, ch. 1-2.
- (C) Bear Braumoeller, *The Great Powers and the International System*, ch. 1-2.
- (C) William Wohlforth et al., "Testing Balance of Power Theory in World History," *European Journal of International Relations* 13:2 (2007), 155-185.

Cooperation under Anarchy (September 26)

*Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*,

ch. 1-6.

(C) Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, ch. 1-2.

RECOMMENDED

(C) Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929-1939*, ch. 1, 14.

(J) Stephen Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," *World Politics* 28:3 (1976), 317-347.

(C) Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, ch. 1-2.

(J) Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: A Review Essay," *World Politics* 44:3 (1992), 466-496.

Institutions and Neoliberal Institutionalism (October 10)

(C) Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," in David A. Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, 85-115.

(J) Steven Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," *World Politics* 43:4 (1991), 336-366.

(J) John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19:3 (1994/1995), 5-49, plus response by Keohane and Martin and counter-reply by Mearsheimer in the Summer 1995 issue of *IS*.

(J) James D. Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," *International Organization* 52:2, 269-305.

(C) Randall W. Stone, *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy*, ch. 1-2.

(C) Julia Gray, *The Company States Keep: International Economic Organization and Sovereign Risk in Emerging Markets*, Introduction and ch. 5.

(C) Judith Kelly and Beth Simmons, *The Power of Global Performance Indicators*, ch. 1.

RECOMMENDED

(J) Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization* 42:3 (1988), 485-507.

(J) Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," *American Political Science Review* 85:3 (1991), 701-726.

(J) Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," *American Political Science Review* 85:4 (1991), 1303-1320.

(J) Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," *International Security* 24:1 (1999), 42-63.

(J) Beth Simmons, "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs," *American Political Science Review* 94:4 (2000), 819-835.

(J) Jana von Stein, "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance," *American Political Science Review* 99:4 (2005), 611-622, plus Simmons and Hopkins response in the same issue.

- (J) Allison Carnegie, "States Held Hostage: Political Hold-Up Problems and the Effects of International Institutions," *American Political Science Review* 108:1 (2014), 54-70.
- (C) Phillip Y. Lipsky, *Renegotiating the World Order: Institutional Change in International Relations*, ch. 1-2.
- (C) James D. Morrow, *Order within Anarchy: The Laws of War as an International Institution*, ch. 1.

SUPPLEMENTAL READINGS

- (J) B. Peter Rosendorff, "Stability and Rigidity: Politics and the Design of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedure," *American Political Science Review* 99:3 (2005), 389-400.
- (J) Alex Thompson, "Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission," *International Organization* 61:1 (2006), 1-34.
- (J) Leslie Johns, "A Servant of Two Masters: Communication and the Selection of International Bureaucrats," *International Organization* 61:2 (2007), 245-275.
- (J) Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, "Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression," *International Organization* 59:3 (2005), 593-629.
- (J) Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, "The Rational Design of International Institutions," *International Organization* 55:4 (2001), 761-799.
- (J) Tana Johnson, "Institutional Design and Bureaucrats' Impact on Political Control," *Journal of Politics* 75:1 (2013), 183-197.

Constructivism (October 17)

- (J) John Gerard Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," *International Organization* 52:4 (1998), 855-885.
- (C) James D. Fearon and Alexander Wendt, "Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View," in Walter Carlsnaes et al., eds., *Handbook of International Relations*, 52-72.
- *Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, ch. 1, 3, 6, 7.

SUPPLEMENTAL READINGS

- (C) Richard Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics*, pp. 255-300.
- (J) Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46:2 (1992), 391-425.
- (J) Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in IR Theory," *International Security* (1998), pp. 171-200.
- Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policy, Moscow, 1955 and 1999*.
- (C) Eric Ringmar, "Performing International Systems: Two East-Asian Alternatives to the Westphalian Order," *International Organization* 66:1 (2012), 1-25.
- (J) Dale C. Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay,"

International Security 25:2 (2000), 187-212.

MIDTERM DISTRIBUTED OCTOBER 10 AND DUE OCTOBER 24!

Ideas and International Politics (October 24)

(J) Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52:4 (1998), 887-917.

(C) Jack Snyder, "Backlash against Human Rights Shaming: Emotions in Groups," *International Theory* 12:1 (2020), 109-132.

(C) Christian Reus-Smit, *Individual Rights and the Making of the International System*, Introduction and ch. 1-2.

(J) John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," *International Organization* (1982), pp. 195-231.

(C) Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, ch. 1.

(C) Dara Kay Cohen and Sabrina Karim, "Does More Equality for Women Mean Less War? Rethinking Sex and Gender Inequality and Political Violence," *International Organization* 76:2 (2022), 414-444.

RECOMMENDED

(J) Thomas Risse, "Let's Argue!: Communicative Action in World Politics," *International Organization* 54:1 (2000), 1-39.

(J) Alastair Iain Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments," *International Studies Quarterly* 45:4 (2001), 487-515.

(C) Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*, Introduction and ch. 1-2.

(C) Stacie Goddard, "When Right Makes Might: How Prussia Overturned the European Balance of Power," *International Security* 33:3 (2009), 110-142.

(C) Joshua Goldstein, *War and Gender*, ch. 1.

SUPPLEMENTAL READINGS

(J) John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," *World Politics* 35:2 (1983), 261-285.

Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War : French And British Military Doctrine Between The Wars*.

Margaret E. Keck and Katherine Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*.

Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, 114-152.

(J) Birgit Locher and Elizabeth Prugl, "Feminism and Constructivism: Worlds Apart or Sharing the Middle Ground?" *International Studies Quarterly*, 45:1 (2001), 111-129.

(J) J. Ann Tickner, "What Is Your Research Program? Some Feminist Answers to International Relations Methodological Questions," *International Studies Quarterly* 49:1 (March 2005), 1-22.

(J) Alexander E. Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," *International Organization* 41:3 (1987), 335-370.

(J) David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" *International Organization* 43:4 (1989), 441-473.

Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force*.

Ian Hurd, *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council*.

Domestic Politics I: Regime Type and International Conflict (October 31)

(C) Emmanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace*.

(C) Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," in Michael E. Brown et al., eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace*, pp. 3-57.

(J) Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., "An Institutional Explanation for the Democratic Peace," *American Political Science Review* 93:4 (1999), 791-807.

(C) Patrick J. McDonald, "Great Powers, Hierarchy, and Endogenous Regimes: Rethinking the Domestic Causes of Peace," *International Organization* 69:3 (2015), 557-588.

(J) Jessica Weeks, "Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 106:2 (2012), 326-347.

(C) Susan D. Hyde and Elizabeth Saunders, "Recapturing Regime Type in International Relations: Leaders, Institutions, and Agency Space," *International Organization* 74:2 (2020), 363-395.

(C) Michael Horowitz and Allan Stam, "How Prior Military Experience Influences the Future Militarized Behavior of Leaders," *International Organization* 68:3 (2014), 527-559.

(C) Michael Horowitz, *The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics*, ch. 1-2.

RECOMMENDED

Michael E. Brown et al., eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace*, chapters by Owen, Layne, Spiro, Farber and Gowa, and Oren (includes most of the prominent arguments against the existence of a relationship between democracy and peace).

(J) John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992," *World Politics* 52:1 (1999), 1-37.

(J) Erik Gartzke, "The Capitalist Peace," *American Journal of Political Science* 51:1 (2007), 166-191.

(J) Allan Dafoe, "Statistical Critiques of the Democratic Peace: Caveat Emptor," *American Journal of Political Science* 55:2 (2011), 247-262.

(J) William R. Thompson, "Democracy and Peace: Putting the Cart before the Horse?" *International Organization* 50:1 (1996), 141-174.

(C) Sebastian Rosato, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory," *American Political Science Review*, 97:4 (2003), 585-602, plus responses by Kinsella and by Slantchev, Alexandrova, and Gartzke in 99:3.

(J) Joslyn N. Barnhart et al., "The Suffragist Peace," *International Organization* 74:4 (2020), 633-670.

Michael Horowitz, Allan Stam, and Cali Ellis, *Why Leaders Fight*.

Elizabeth Saunders, *Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions*.

Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*.

(C) Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, esp. ch. 3.

(C) Tyler Jost, "The Institutional Origins of Miscalculation in China's International Crises," *International Security* 48:1 (2023), 47-90.

(C) Robert Schub, "Informing the Leader: Bureaucracies and International Crises," *American Political Science Review* 116:4 (2022), 1460-1476.

SUPPLEMENTAL READINGS

Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire*, ch. 1-2.

(J) Ed Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security* 20 (1995), 5-38.

(C) Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, *Democracies at War*, ch. 1-3, 8.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival*, ch. 1.

Domestic Politics II: Open Economy Politics (November 7)

(J) Helen V. Milner, "Resisting the Protectionist Temptation," *International Organization* 41:4 (1987), pp. 339-65.

(J) Jeffrey A. Frieden, "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance," *International Organization* (1991), pp. 425-51.

(J) Ronald Rogowski, "Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade," *American Political Science Review* 81:4 (1987), 1121-1137.

(J) Italo Colantone and Piero Stanig, "The Trade Origins of Economic Nationalism: Import Competition and Voting Behavior in Western Europe," *American Journal of Political Science* 62:4 (2018), 936-953.

(C) Stefanie Walter, "The Backlash against Globalization," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 24:1 (2021), 421-442.

SUPPLEMENTAL READINGS

(J) Gourevitch, Peter, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," *International Organization* 32:4 (1978), 881-911.

(J) Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42:3 (1988), 427-60.

(J) Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization* 51:4 (1997), 513-553.

(C) Edward D. Mansfield and Helen Milner, *The Politics of International Cooperation: Trade, Democracy, and Veto Players*, ch. 1-2.

David H. Autor et al., "The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to Large

Changes in Trade,” *Annual Review of Economics* 8 (2016), 205-240.

International Order (November 14)

(C) Hedley Bull, *Order within Anarchy*, ch. 1, 3.

(C) G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, ch. 1-3.

(C) David Kang, “International Order in Historical East Asia: Tribute and Hierarchy Beyond Sinocentrism and Eurocentrism,” *International Organization* 74:1 (2020), 65-93.

(C) Bentley B. Allan et al., “The Distribution of Identity and the Future of International Order: China’s Hegemonic Prospects,” *International Organization* 72:4 (2018), 839-869.

(C) John J. Mearsheimer, “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order,” *International Security* 43:4 (2019), 7-50.

(C) Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Ayşe Zarakol, “Struggles for Recognition: The Liberal International Order and the Merger of Its Discontents,” *International Organization* 75:S2 (2021), 611-634.

RECOMMENDED READINGS

(C) Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*

SUPPLEMENTAL READINGS

Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*

Andrew Phillips, *War, Religion, and Empire: The Transformation of International Orders*

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