

Fall 2024  
Economics 8000  
Repeated Games, Reputations, and Incomplete Information  
Syllabus (Preliminary)  
April 30, 2024

**Class time and place:** Second session, Tuesdays and Thursdays 1:45–3:14PM. (first lecture 10/17/2024, last lecture 12/05/2024).

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office hours: by appointment.

The following is a tentative outline of what I intend to cover. The list of papers is suggestive only—not only can I not cover all these papers, but I may replace some by others.

My goal is to make most of this material useful for nontheorists (who may need to use and understand these models).

## 1 Repeated Games

1. Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring: Structure and the folk theorem.

The classic papers: Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990); Fudenberg and Levine (1994); Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994).

Textbook treatment: Mailath and Samuelson (2006, Chapters 7-9).

2. Applications (relational contracting, trading favors, repeated adverse selections, principal agency, stochastic games)

Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991); Bhaskar and Mailath (2019); Escobar and Toikka (2013); Escobar and Llanes (2018); Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2010); Levin (2003); Mailath and Samuelson (2006, Chapter 11); Olszewski and Safronov (2018); Samuelson and Stacchetti (2017).

3. Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Structure.

Mailath and Samuelson (2006, Chapters 12-13); Bhaskar, Mailath, and Morris (2008); Ely, Hörner, and Olszewski (2005); Hörner and Olszewski (2006, 2009); Mailath and Olszewski (2011); Olszewski (2007).

4. Applications (communication, stochastic games)

Awaya and Krishna (2016, 2019); Compte (1998, 2002); Fuchs (2007, 2015); Jullien and Park (2014, 2019); Kandori and Matsushima (1998).

5. Repeated games with anonymous random matching.  
Kandori (1992); Ellison (1994); Deb (2020); Deb, Sugaya, and Wolitzky (2020); Ghosh and Ray (1996); Sugaya and Wolitzky (2020); Wolitzky (2021).
6. Repeated games in continuous time  
Bergin and MacLeod (1993); Bernard and Frei (2016); Fudenberg and Levine (2007, 2009); Sannikov (2007); Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2010, 2007).

## 2 Reputations

1. General reference: Mailath and Samuelson (2014).
2. An introduction to reputations  
The classic papers: Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982); Kreps and Wilson (1982); Milgrom and Roberts (1982), Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992).  
Textbook treatment: Mailath and Samuelson (2006).
3. Reputations via entropy  
Gossner (2011); Mailath and Samuelson (2014).  
Background and additional readings on entropy: Blackwell and Dubins (1962); Cover and Thomas (2006, chapter 2); Gossner and Tomala (2008); Cabrales, Gossner, and Serrano (2013).
4. Disappearing reputations  
Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004, 2007).
5. Applications and Extensions  
Mailath and Samuelson (2001); Benabou and Laroque (1992); Phelan (2006); Liu (2011); Morris (2001); Wiseman (2009); Hu (2014); Ekmekci, Gossner, and Wilson (2012); Pei (2020).

## 3 Foundations of Incomplete Information Games

1. General reference: Dekel and Siniscalchi (2014).
2. Universal type spaces: Mertens and Zamir (1985); Brandenburger and Dekel (1993).
3. Robustness of solution concepts: Fudenberg, Kreps, and Levine (1988); Dekel and Fudenberg (1990); Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006); Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler (2008); Weinstein and Yildiz (2007, 2013); Ely and Peski (2011); Chen and Xiong (2013); Chen, Takahashi, and Xiong (2014); Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold, and Xiong (2010, 2017); Heifetz and Kets (2018); Germano, Weinstein, and Zuazo-Garin (2020).

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